Deniable Ring Signatures by Reich, Eitan
Deniable Ring Signatures
by
Eitan Reich
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Engineering in Computer Science and Engineering
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
@ Massachusetts
May 2007
Institute of Technology 2007. All rights reserved.
Author ............................. ..............
Department of Electri al/ 'ee ng and Computer Science
May 8, 2007
C ertified by........... ...............................
Silvio Micali
Professor
Accepted by
Thesis Supervisor
.. i.. ... ...................
Arthur C. Smith
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students
ArACHUSE:TS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
OCT 0 3 2007CHIVES
LIBRARIES

Deniable Ring Signatures
by
Eitan Reich
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
on May 8, 2007, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Engineering in Computer Science and Engineering
Abstract
Ring Signatures were developed by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman, in a paper titled
How to Leak a Secret, as a cryptographically secure way to authenticate messages
with respect to ad-hoc groups while still maintaining the signer's anonymity. While
their initial scheme assumed the existence of random oracles, in 2005 a scheme was
developed that does not use random oracles and meets the strongest security defini-
tions known in the literature. We argue that this scheme is not deniable, meaning if
someone signs a message with respect to a ring of possible signers, and at a later time
the secret keys of all of the possible signers are confiscated (including the author),
then the author's anonymity is no longer guaranteed. We propose a modification to
the scheme that guarantees anonymity even in this situation, using a scheme that
depends on ring signature users generating keys that do not distinguish them from
other users who did not intend to participate in ring signature schemes, so that our
scheme can truly be called a deniable ring signature scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ring signature schemes, first developed by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman [13, 14), allow
a user to sign a message anonymously with respect to a ring (essentially a group or list)
of possible signers as long as that list includes the actual signer. The basic security
requirements for such a scheme are unforgeability and anonymity. Unforgeability
means that someone must be in the ring to produce a ring signature for that ring
and anonymity essentially means that the ring signature gives no more information
about the signer's identity other than the fact that it is one of the members of the
ring. Ring signatures differ from the seemingly related notion of group signatures in
several main respects. Group signatures [4] include a central authority that can reveal
the identity of a signer and the group of possible signers is fixed in advance. Ring
signature schemes are much more flexible because there is no such central authority,
and the members included in a ring of possible signers can be chosen at the time the
message is signed and therefore need not be fixed. This means that someone that had
no intention of ever participating in ring signature schemes may still be included in
a ring signature as a possible signer. This flexibility leads to a variety of applications
for ring signature schemes.
The canonical application for ring signature schemes is for whistle blowing, as
stated in the title of the first work in this area, "How to leak a secret" [131. For
example, a member of the board of directors of a company may wish to make known
the illegal activities going on in the company without revealing their own identity but
still proving that the message came from a valid source. This board member could
use ring signatures to sign their message with respect to a ring of possible signers that
includes all of the board members. Another interesting application of ring signatures
is for designated verifier e-mail. If a sender signs their e-mail message with respect
to the ring of two users including the sender and receiver, then the receiver will be
convinced that the message came from the claimed sender, but they will not be able
to prove this to anyone else because the receiver could have produced this signature
themselves. One final application we will mention here is electronic voting [11]. A
vote can be a ring signature with respect to the ring of eligible voters so that votes
can be made public and counted publicly without revealing the votes of individual
people. The property of linkability is augmented onto basic ring signature schemes
to ensure that people can't vote twice.
The original ring signature scheme in [13] elegantly uses public-key encryption to
achieve anonymity and unforgeability. Any user who publishes a public key of the
type used in the scheme can therefore be included in a ring signature even if they
never anticipated participating in ring signatures. This flexibility was extended in [1]
where it was shown that ring signature schemes could be based on public encryption
keys even if the keys are not all of the same type. The main drawback of these schemes
were their dependence on random oracles, a sort of idealized hash function that is
used in theoretical work but is assumed to be replaced by a hash function in practice.
This dependence is seen as a drawback since it was shown in [12] that the random
oracle model is not secure, in the sense that there exist cryptosystems that are secure
using random oracles, but are not secure whenever these oracles are replaced by real
world hash functions. This motivates the recent results of [2] that first demonstrate
the existence of ring signature schemes without random oracles, which are the basis
for the work in this thesis.
In addition to developing a ring signature scheme that does not use random or-
acles, [2] give the strongest security requirements for unforgeability and anonymity
known in the literature and show that their scheme meets these requirements. The
two strongest anonymity requirements they propose are anonymity against attribut-
ion attacks and anonymity against full key exposure. The first of these requirements
guarantees anonymity even if the adversary is given the secret keys (and random-
ness that generated these keys) for all but one of the possible signers in the ring.
Anonymity against full key exposure is the stronger of the two requirements, guar-
anteeing anonymity even if the adversary knows the secret keys and randomness for
all of the members of the ring. While the scheme presented in [2] meets the weaker
of these two requirements, they propose a slight variation on their scheme that meets
the stronger requirement, by having users generate encryption keys for which they
themselves don't even know the secret key. We argue that this variation is inconsis-
tent with the ad-hoc nature of ring signatures, because the other users included in
the ring may actually know their own secret keys and therefore the real signer can be
distinguished from the other members of the ring by being the only member who can
not produce their secret key. We argue that in order for ring signatures to be deni-
able, all of the keys used by the signer must be indistinguishable from the keys of the
other members of the ring, even in the situation where the secret keys are exposed.
We build on the scheme of [2] to produce a scheme without random oracles that is
anonymous with respect to full 'key exposure and depends on the use of keys that will
not distinguish ring signature participants from those users who had no intention of
participating in ring signature schemes.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this section we present some of the notation and basic definitions we will be us-
ing throughout the paper. We will introduce some of the notation and definitions
to describe probabilistic algorithms and some of the definitions needed to concisely
describe the assumptions and results we will be working with.
2.1 Notation
Since we will often be working with probabilistic algorithms, we define A(x), where
A is a probabilistic algorithm and x is an input to that algorithm, as the distribution
that assigns to every string y the probability that algorithm A on input x produces
y. We will use A(x; w) to refer to the deterministic computation of A on input x with
w as its random coins. When A is both probabilistic and runs in polynomial time, we
will sometimes refer to it as a PPT (Probabilistic Polynomial Time algorithm). In
general if S is a probability space, we may write x +- S to mean that x is chosen at
random from S.
When we say a function f is negligible, we mean that for every polynomial p(n),
there exists some no such that f(n) < for all n > no. In such a case we may
also write f(n) = negl(n). Similarly we say that a function f is non-negligible if there
exists some polynomial p(n) such that f(n) >1 for infinitely many n.
2.2 One-way Functions
Most of the results in modern cryptography are based on either assumptions about the
hardness of some problems (such as number-theoretic problems) or standard assump-
tions such as the existence of one-way or trapdoor one-way functions or permutations.
To summarize, a one-way function is a function that is easy to compute but hard to
invert, while a trapdoor one-way function is a one-way function that is easy to invert
if one knows some secret trapdoor information. We define one-way functions here:
Definition 1 (One-way Functions) A one-way function is a function f that sat-
isfies the following two properties:
1. f can be computed in polynomial time.
2. f is hard to invert, meaning for any non-uniform PPT A, for any auxiliary
input zn,
Pr[x +- {0, 1}n; y - A(f(x), zn); f(x) = f(y)] = negl(n)
2.3 Computational Indistinguishibility
Many of the results we will address in this paper are framed in terms of computational
indistinguishibility, which is essentially a way to express the difficulty of distinguishing
between two ensembles of probability distributions. For example, we will obtain
pseudorandom numbers from one-way functions and express our results in the form
of computational indistinguishibility to say that no efficient algorithm could tell the
difference between pseudorandom numbers and truly random numbers. In general we
define computational indistinguishibility in terms of an adversarial game:
Definition 2 (Computational Indistinguishibility) Two ensembles of probabil-
ity distributions, { Ax }x)i and { Bx )EI are said to be Computationally Indistinguishi-
ble if for any non-uniform PPT D, for all x E I n {0, 1}n , and any auxiliary input
zn,
IPr[y +- A(x); D(x, y, z) = 1] - Pr[y +- B(x); D(x, y, z) = 1]1 = negl(n)
In such a case we may use the shorthand {Ax} I {B, }.

Chapter 3
Previous Work
In this section we present the basic cryptographic primitives and constructions that
will be used to construct the deniable ring signature scheme in the next section. The
results we present are all framed in terms of adversarial games and the assumptions
used are all stated in terms of generic complexity based assumptions, such as the
existence of one way functions, or number theoretic assumptions, such as the difficulty
of distinguishing quadratic residues from quadratic non-residues.
The first primitive we present, Pseudorandom Number Generators, provides the
basis for the main innovation in our scheme. The next three sections, about Public-
key Encryption, Digital Signatures, and Zero Knowledge Proofs, introduce primitives
that are used in the Ring Signature scheme in [2], which is also the last subsection and
the basis for our construction in the next section. For the basic primitives (the first
four sections) we simply provide the definitions and theorems we will use later, while
for the section presenting the scheme in [2] we provide more detail because we will
be using the main ideas from it in our own construction rather than simply applying
results.
3.1 Pseudorandom Generators
The goal of pseudorandom generators is to take random strings and expand them
into longer strings that appear to be random. The result that we will use is that
the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of pseudorandom generators.
We first define pseudorandom generators as they were defined in [3, 7], as functions
that stretch random strings of length n to strings of length polynomial in n that are
indistinguishable from random:
Definition 3 (Pseudorandom Generator) Let f,: {0, 1}n -_+ {0, 1}1( ) be a poly-
nomial time function ensemble for some polynomial l(n) > n. {fn}neN is a Pseudo-
random Generator if the probability ensemble of f, on random strings of length n is
computationally indistinguishable from the probability ensemble of random strings of
length l(n).
It was originally shown by Blum and Micali [3] that pseudorandom generators
can be constructed from functions f that have a hard-core predicate b, meaning b(x)
can be computed easily given x but can not be computed given only f(x). These
pseudorandom generators can expand the random input by any polynomial amount
by cleverly repeating the application of the hard-core predicate to obtain extra bits.
Goldreich and Levin [7] then showed that any one-way function can be turned into
a function with a hard-core predicate that can be used for pseudorandom generators
as in [3]. This gives us the following theorem:
Theorem 4 If One-way Functions exist, then there exist Pseudorandom Generators
for any polynomial l(n).
3.2 Public-key Encryption
To construct ring signature schemes as in [2] we will be using public-key encryption
schemes with the property that no feasible adversary can distinguish between en-
cryptions of two different messages chosen by the adversary. This property, known
as polynomial security against chosen plaintext attacks, has been shown to be equiv-
alent to semantic security, which was presented by Goldwasser and Micali [8], and
essentially means that no feasible adversary can obtain any partial information about
a message given only an encryption of that message. While there exist encryption
schemes that meet stronger security definitions, such as security against chosen ci-
phertext attacks, the requirements from [8] will be sufficient for constructing our ring
signature schemes. We first define a probabilistic public-key encryption scheme:
Definition 5 (Public-key Encryption Scheme) A Public-key Encryption Scheme
is a triplet of PPTs (G, E, D) where
* G is a key generator that takes input 1k, where k is the security parameter, and
returns (PK, SK) where PK is the public key and SK is the secret key.
* E is an encryption algorithm that takes as input a message m and the public
key PK of the recipient of the message, and returns a ciphertext c = EPK (m).
* D is a decryption algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext c and the secret key
SK of the user and returns the original message m = DSK(C).
* For all key pairs (PK, SK) that G might produce, and for all messages m,
Pr[DSK(EPK(m)) = mi = 1.
We will now formally define polynomial security against chosen plaintext attacks
in terms of an adversarial game. The idea is that the adversary, given the public key,
will produce two messages that it claims to be able to distinguish between if given
an encryption of one of them. After receiving an encryption of one of the messages,
it will guess which message was encrypted and we will assert the probability that the
adversary is correct is no more than negligibly far from 1:
Definition 6 (Chosen Plaintext Security) A public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D)
is polynomially secure against Chosen Plaintext attacks if for any PPT A the proba-
bility p(n) that A succeeds at the following game satisfies Ip(n) - I1 = negl(n):
1. Keys (PK, SK) +- G(1") are generated randomly and PK is given to A.
2. A returns two messages, mo and mi
.
3. A bit b is chosen at random and A is given c - EpK(mb).
4. A returns b' E {0, 1} and succeeds if b' = b.
Since this security definition is equivalent to semantic security, we may use this
definition when describing schemes that we assume to be semantically secure. Several
semantically secure encryption systems have been developed under various assump-
tions, such as the number theoretic Quadratic Residuosity Assumption. We will use
these results to construct ring signature schemes, and state the theorem to be used
here:
Theorem 7 Under the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, there exist public-key en-
cryption schemes that are semantically secure.
3.3 Digital Signatures
In addition to public-key encryption, the ring signature scheme of [2] also utilizes dig-
ital signatures. However, unlike with encryption, the signature schemes they assume
use the strongest security definitions in the literature. In particular they use signature
schemes for which any adversary, even if given access to an oracle to produce sample
signatures, has no more than a negligible chance of producing a forgery of a message
for which it did not already query the oracle. This security requirement is known
as existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks. Before defining
any security notions, we first define digital signature schemes as we did for public-key
encryption schemes earlier:
Definition 8 (Digital Signature Scheme) A Digital Signature Scheme is a triplet
of PPTs (G, S, V) where
* G is a key generator that takes input 1 k, where k is the security parameter, and
returns (PK, SK) where PK is the public key and SK is the secret key.
* S is a signing algorithm that takes as input a message m and the secret key SK
of the user, and returns a signature a = SsK(m).
* V is a verification algorithm that takes as input a signature a and the public
key PK of the claimed signer and returns a bit b = VpK(m, a) where b = 1
(respectively 0) if the signature is valid (respectively invalid).
* For all key pairs (PK, SK) that G might produce, and for all messages m,
Pr[VpK(m, SSK(m) = 1] = 1.
We will now define the security requirement we will use for signature schemes in
this paper in terms of an adversarial game as we did for public-key encryption. The
idea is that the adversary will be given a public key and access to a signing oracle and
is then challenged to produce a forgery of any message for which he did not already
query the oracle. The requirement is that the adversary must succeed with no more
than negligible probability:
Definition 9 (Chosen Message Security) A digital signature scheme (G, S, V) is
secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks if for any
PPT A the probability p(n) that A succeeds at the following game satisfies p(n) =
negl(n):
1. Keys (PK, SK) <- G(1") are generated randomly and PK is given to A.
2. A is given access to a signing oracle SO that it can adaptively query with queries
of the form SO(m), which return a signature oa SsK(m).
3. A returns a signature a for a message m and succeeds if m was never queried
to the oracle and VPK(m, U) = 1.
It was first shown by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [10] that there exist digital
signature schemes that meet this strongest security definition under the number the-
oretic assumption that factoring is hard. It was later shown by Rompel [15] that the
assumption can be weakened to just the existence of one-way functions, giving us the
following result which we will use to construct ring signatures:
Theorem 10 The existence of one-way functions implies the existence of Digital
Signature schemes that are secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-
message attacks.
3.4 Zero Knowledge and ZAPs
The final cryptographic primitive we will present before constructing the ring signa-
ture scheme of [2] is Zero Knowledge Proofs, of which ZAPs are a particular flavor.
Zero Knowledge Proofs were first proposed by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [9] as
an interactive proof technique whereby a prover could prove a statement to a verifier
without giving away any more information other than the fact that the statement is
true. For example, a prover could prove that a graph is 3-colorable given a witness,
such as a 3-coloring of the graph, without giving away the witness or even divulging
any information about the witness. Informally, the requirements for a protocol to be
a Zero Knowledge Proof System are the following:
1. Completeness: The prover should be able to prove any true statement.
2. Soundness: It should be very hard for any prover to prove any false statement.
3. Zero Knowledge: No verifier should be able to obtain any information from
interacting with the prover other than what it could have obtained on its own.
Feige and Shamir [6] introduced a weaker requirement called witness indistin-
guishibility to replace the zero knowledge requirement. Witness indistinguishibility
allows information to leak about the witness but asserts that if there are several wit-
nesses for a statement proven, then the verifier does not learn any information about
which witness the prover used to construct the proof. To give a rough idea of why this
weaker requirement will suffice for ring signatures, we will see that zero knowledge
proofs will be used to hide the identity of the signer of a ring signature. Since the
possible witnesses correspond to the possible signers (i.e. the ring members), we need
not hide all information; we just need to give no information about which witness
was used.
The ring signature scheme we will look at in the next section is heavily dependent
on ZAPs, which are a kind of 2-round witness indistinguishable protocol developed by
Dwork and Naor [5] that can be used to prove statements of the form x E L for any
language L in NP. Associated with any NP language L is a polynomially bounded
witness relation RL such that x E L 4=* 3w, (x, w) E RL. The idea of ZAPs
is that the verifier sends a first message r and the prover responds with a proof 7r,
which it can produce because it has access to a witness w for the statement x. These
two rounds of communication complete the protocol, and witness indistinguishibility
guarantees that the verifier can not tell which witness was used from all of the w such
that (x, w) E RL. It is even shown that the first message can be fixed and used to
prove many different statements, so that someone can post their first message as a
kind of public key that people can look up in a directory when they want to prove a
statement to that person. The formal definition of a ZAP is given below:
Definition 11 (ZAP) A ZAP is a triplet (P, V, 1) where P is a PPT prover, V is
a polynomial time deterministic verifier, and l(n) is a polynomial satisfying the three
following conditions:
1. Completeness: For all (x, w) E RL and all r E {0, 1}1(n),
Pr[r +-- Pr(x, w); Vr(x, 7r) = 1] = 1
2. Adaptive Soundness: With high probability there is no x V L for which there
is a valid proof:
Pr[r + {O, 1}"(n); 3(x, r), x V L, V,(x, 7r) = 1] = negl(n)
3. Witness Indistinguishibility: For any x E L and pair of witnesses wo
and wl such that (x, wo) E RL and (x, wi) E RL, the pair of ensembles of
probability distributions {P,,(x, wo)} and {P, (x, wl)} indexed over n, where
rn + {0, 1}' (n), are computationally indistinguishable.
The ring signature scheme in the next section as well as the modified scheme
presented in this paper both use the following result from [5] to construct ZAPs for
particular NP languages related to ring signatures:
Theorem 12 (ZAPs) There exist ZAPs for any language L E NP.
3.5 Ring Signatures without Random Oracles
The first ring signature scheme that was not dependent on random oracles was in-
troduced by Bender, Katz and Morselli [2], in a paper that also introduced stronger
security requirements. The requirement we will focus on in this paper is anonymity,
since this is the area we will show improvement. The main scheme presented in [2]
does not meet the strongest anonymity requirement they propose. While they pro-
pose a modification to meet the strongest anonymity definition, we will argue that
this modification is inconsistent with the aims of ring signatures because it eliminates
deniability. In this section we will first present the definitions of a ring signature
scheme and the security definitions from [2], then we will present their main scheme,
and finally we will review their modification and argue why a different type of modi-
fication is necessary to achieve the strongest anonymity requirement.
3.5.1 Definitions
We first provide a formal definition of a ring signature scheme. A ring signature
scheme has a similar formal structure to an ordinary signature scheme except that to
create a signature, in addition to using a secret key, one also uses the public keys of
the other users that are to be included in the ring.
Definition 13 (Ring Signature Scheme) A Ring Signature Scheme is a triplet of
PPTs (G, S, V) where
* G is a key generator that takes input In, where n is the security parameter, and
returns (PK, SK) where PK is the public key and SK is the secret key.
* S is a signing algorithm that takes as input a message m, a ring R = (PK, , PK1)
of public keys, a user i* and their secret key SKi., and returns a signature a =
Si.,SK,. (m, R). We assume here that (SKi., PKi.) is a valid key pair generated
by G and IRI > 2.
* V is a verification algorithm that takes as input a signature a and a ring
R = (PK1,..., PK1) of public keys and returns a bit b = VR(m, a) where b = 1
(respectively 0) if the signature is valid (respectively invalid).
* For any polynomial 1 in n, and any set of key pairs {(PKi, SKi)}'=l that G(1 n)
might produce, and for any message m and user i* E [1, 1], Pr [VR(m, Si.,SK.. (m, R)) =
1] = 1, where R = (PKi,..., PK1 ).
One thing to note here is that because of the ad-hoc nature of ring signatures,
and the fact that we will want to sign messages with respect to rings that include
users that never planned on participating in ring signature schemes, the key gener-
ator algorithm must perform a function that most people already perform on their
own without intending to do ring signatures. For example, the public keys could be
public encryption keys or public keys for digital signature schemes, or some combi-
nation thereof, because it is expected that most people create and publish such keys
regardless of the existence of ring signature schemes that utilize them. On the other
hand, a key generator algorithm for ring signatures that requires users to generate
public keys that are not ubiquitous, such as a specially designed key made with ring
signatures in mind, would not be of much use because then one would not be able to
sign messages with respect to rings that include people who were not also interested
in doing ring signatures.
We now give the strongest unforgeability definition given in [2], which they refer to
as unforgeability with respect to insider corruption. The idea behind the adversarial
game in this definition is that the adversary is given a set of validly generated public
keys, and an oracle in which it can make queries with respect to a ring of its choice
(even rings including adversarially generated keys). The adversary is even given the
power to choose the author in the oracle queries, provided the specified author does
not correspond to one of the adversarially generated keys. The requirement is that
the adversary succeeds in this game by producing a forgery, i.e. a signature for a
message and ring it never queried before, with negligible probability.
Definition 14 (Unforgeability) A ring signature scheme (G, S, V) is unforgeable
if for any PPT A and any polynomial k the probability p(n) that A succeeds at the
following game satisfies p(n) = negl(n):
1. Keys {(PKi, SKi))l})  <- G(1") are generated randomly and the set of public
keys S = {PK}•](n) is given to A.
2. A is given access to a signing oracle SO that it can adaptively query with queries
of the form SO(i*, m, R), which return a signature a +- SSK,. (m, R), under the
condition that PKW, E R.
3. A is also given access to a corruption oracle CO that it can query with queries
of the form CO(i*), which returns the secret key SKi..
4. A returns a signature a for a message m and a ring S* and succeeds if SO was
never queried with message m and ring S*, S* C S - C (where C is the set of
corrupted users) and Vs.(m, a) = 1.
We will now see the two strongest anonymity definitions presented in [2], anonymity
against attribution attacks and anonymity with respect to full key exposure. The def-
initions are very similar and differ only in a single detail related to the powers granted
to the adversary. In both adversarial games, the adversary is given a signing oracle
as in the unforgeability definition, and is supposed to produce a sample message m,
a ring R, and two possible signers io and il in R. The adversary is then given a ring
signature of m with respect to R, signed by one of the two authors, and the adversary
is supposed to guess which author was used. In both anonymity definitions, along
with the challenge signature, the adversary is given the randomness to generate the
keys for several users in the ring R. The difference between the two definitions is
that in the weaker definition the adversary is given the randomness for all but one of
the users, while in the stronger definition the adversary is given the randomness to
compute the keys for all users. The two definitions are presented together because
they only differ in one place:
Definition 15 (Anonymity against attribution attacks / full-key exposure)
A ring signature scheme (G, S, V) is anonymous against attribution attacks if for any
PPT A and polynomial 1, the probability p(n) that A succeeds at the following game
satisfies jp(n) - 1I = negl(n):
1. Keys {(PK, SK.)}l} +- G(1n ) are generated randomly and the set of public
keys S = {Pji 11(l is given to A. A is given access to a signing oracle SO that
it can adaptively query with queries of the form SO(i*, m, R), which return a
signature a -- SSK,. (m, R), under the condition that PKi. E R.
2. A outputs a message m, a ring R, and the indices of two users io and il such
that PKio and PKg, are both in R.
3. A random bit b is selected and A is given a signature a +- SSKib (m, R) as well
as {W}i)jAo-
4. A outputs a bit b' and succeeds if b' = b.
If in step 3 the adversary is also given the randomness wi0 then we say that the scheme
is anonymous against full key exposure.
3.5.2 Scheme from [2]
The main scheme from [2] meets the strongest unforgeability requirement and the
weaker of the two anonymity requirements presented in the last section. The scheme
assumes the existence of a semantically secure encryption scheme (GE, E, D), a digital
signature scheme (GS, Ss, V s ) and a ZAP (P, Vz,1) for a particular NP language that
we will define. The idea of the scheme is that for a user to sign a message m, with
respect to a ring R containing that user, the user first signs the message with their
own ordinary signature, then encrypts this signature using the public encryption keys
of all the users in the ring, and then proves using the ZAP that the encryption is an
encryption of a signature of m using the secret signing keys of one of the members
of the ring. Therefore a public key PK for a ring signature scheme really consists of
a public encryption key, a public signature key, and a ZAP message corresponding
to the first message sent by the verifier, while a secret key SK for a ring signature
scheme consists of a secret signature key to produce the ordinary signature.
To illustrate the scheme more clearly, we will begin by defining what we mean
when we say the user encrypts using the public encryption keys of all the users in
a ring. We define an encryption ERE (a) of a message a with respect to the ring of
public encryption keys RE = {PK}i 1 as follows: First select k - 1 random strings
sl,..., Sk-1 E {0, 1}1 l1 of the same size as a. We then define the cipher text C as:
C = ERa(a) = EPK(Sl), EpK (S2) ,..., EPKE1 (Sk-1), EPKE( ($ SO
i=1
It can be shown that this larger encryption scheme is also semantically secure as
long as the secret keys of at least one of the users in the ring RE is kept secret.
We can now describe in more detail how the ring signature scheme works. After
the user i* in a ring of k users creates an ordinary signature a, they create a ciphertext
Ci. = ERE(a). Additionally the user creates k-1 more ciphertexts {Ci = ERE (0)}i#i*
There are now k ciphertexts CO, ..., Ck, and the author of the ring signature, user i*,
has encrypted their signature into the i*th ciphertext, and encrypted 0 into the rest.
The semantic security of the encryption scheme hides which ciphertext contains an
encryption of a signature. Now the user can prove, using the ZAP, that there exists
some i between 1 and k such that the ith ciphertext has the signature of the ith user.
This corresponds to proving membership in the following NP language, where Rs is
defined similarly to RE except for public signing keys rather than public encryption
keys:
k
L = {(m, Rs, RE, Ci ) a, w, s.t. V(ERE(a; w) = Ci A VSKs(m,a) = 1)}
i=1
The language is obviously in NP because there is only a single existential quanti-
fier, the variables are all polynomial size in n, and the statement can be checked in
polynomial time because the PPT ERE becomes deterministic once the randomness
w is provided and the signature verification algorithm V is deterministic polynomial
time to begin with.
We are now ready to define the ring signature scheme (G, S, V) formally:
* Key Generator G(1"):
1. Generate signing key pair (PKS, SK s ) -- GS(1").
2. Generate encryption key pair (PKE, SKE) + GE(1n ) (we will ignore the
secret encryption key for ring signature purposes).
3. Choose an initial ZAP message r +- {0, 1}1 (n).
4. Output as the public key PK = (PK s , PKE, r) and as the private key
SK = SK s .
* Signing Algorithm Si-,SK .(m, R):
1. Parse R = (PK 1,..., PKk) and each PKi = (PKs, PKE, r2 ) and SKi. = SKi..
Set RE = (PK E , ..., PKf ) and Rs = (PKf , ..., PKS).
2. Set M = mlPK1 I...IPKk where "I" denotes string concatenation and com-
pute the digital signature a = S (M).
3. Compute ciphertext Ci = ERE (a) and record the random coins used in
Wi*.
4. Compute ciphertexts Ci = ERE(0) for each if i*.
5. Set statement x -= (M, Rs, RE, {C}=), and witness w = (oi., w.) and
use the ZAP with the first message rl from the lexicographically first public
key to produce the proof ir +- P,, (x, w) of the statement x E L.
6. Output the signature a = ({Ci}k=l, 7).
* Verification Algorithm VR(m, a):
1. Parse R = (PK 1, ..., PKk) and each PKi = (PKW, PKE , ri) and a =- ({C}il, 7r).
Set RE =- (PK, ..., EPK), Rs = (PKf, ..., PK(S), and M = mlPKlI...IPKk.
2. Set statement x = (M, Rs, RE, {Ci}=1).
3. Verify the proof 7r of x E L signature and output Vz(x, Xr).
This ring signature scheme can be shown to achieve the highest unforgeability
guarantee. However it only achieves anonymity with respect to attribution attacks
because if all of the secret keys are exposed, then the encryption scheme ERE can
be decrypted and the ordinary signature will be seen in the clear beneath one of the
ciphertexts, thereby giving away the signer's identity. If all but one of the secret
keys are exposed, however, the signer's identity will still be kept secret because the
encryption will still be unbroken, giving us the following theorem from [2]:
Theorem 16 If (GE, E, D) is a semantically secure encryption scheme, (Gs, Ss, VS)
is a signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message
attacks, and (P, Vz, 1) is a ZAP for the language L, then the ring signature scheme
defined above is unforgeable and anonymous against attribution attacks.
3.5.3 Achieving the strongest anonymity guarantee
The reason why the ring signature scheme from [2] does not achieve the strongest
anonymity guarantee is because the encryption scheme they propose is not secure if
all of the secret keys are exposed. To solve this problem they propose a modification
to their scheme in which an oblivious encryption key generator is used, rather than a
standard encryption key generator. If an encryption system has an oblivious gener-
ator, this means that a user can generate a public encryption key for which they do
not know the secret key. Oblivious key generators also allow the user to expose the
randomness used to generate the public key and still know that it will be infeasible
for an adversary to distinguish their public keys from keys for which the secret key
is known. This modification to the scheme achieves anonymity against full key expo-
sure because now we can reveal the randomness used to generate all of the encryption
keys, and the adversary will still not be able to decrypt the ciphertexts because they
will not be given the decryption keys.
There are several reasons why this modification, while it does satisfy the strongest
anonymity definition, is unsatisfactory. The first reason is that this would require a
user to publish encryption keys for which they do not know the secret key, and pass
this off as a regular encryption key that they will use to receive secure communica-
tion. Using an oblivious generator eliminates the ability to actually use the key for
encryption because the messages can not be decrypted. While the definition of ring
signature schemes does not explicitly require that the primary functionality of the
primitives that ring signatures are built on be preserved, this is certainly a weakness
of this scheme.
A more significant weakness of the scheme under this modification is that the
adversarial game in the strongest anonymity definition no longer models the real world
situation accurately if such keys are used. In the adversarial game, both users that
the adversary is trying to distinguish between as author have had their keys generated
specifically for ring signatures, so that the encryption keys were generated without any
known private key. The corresponding situation in the real world is that all members
of a ring have had their secret encryption keys exposed, either by coercion or other
means, except for two members, both of whom generated their keys obliviously (i.e.
without a private key) because they both intended to participate in ring signatures.
Even under coercion, these two users can claim inability to produce their private keys
because their public keys were indeed produced obliviously, though in the process
they will be forced to admit their intention to participate in ring signature schemes.
While in this situation, anonymity would be preserved, the adversarial game does not
capture another plausible situation in which a user signs a ring signature with respect
to a ring of users all of whom (except for the signer) have the private encryption keys
to go along with their public keys. In this situation, all the users' keys will be
exposed and the signer will be the only user who claims inability to produce secret
keys. While even in this case the ciphertexts can not be decrypted, anonymity is no
longer preserved because the ring member who can not produce their private keys
can no longer deny their involvement with ring signatures while everyone else can.
What we really seek is a scheme that meets the strongest anonymity requirement
and is also built on cryptographic primitives that are identical to those of users who
had no intention of participating in ring signatures. In such a scheme, even when all
the members of a ring are coerced to give up the randomness used to generate their
keys, ring signature participants still have deniability, or the ability to deny partici-
pation in ring signature schemes. An oblivious key generator has deniability until the
point at which the randomness and secret keys are exposed, at which point users who
did not use the oblivious key generator will give up their secret keys and thereby dis-
tinguish themselves from those who intended to participate in ring signatures. In the
next section we will modify the ring signature scheme from [2] to produce a scheme
that meets the strongest security definitions from [2] and is also deniable.

Chapter 4
Deniable Ring Signature Scheme
We will modify the scheme in [2] so that it achieves the strongest security guarantees
while also achieving deniability. By deniability we mean that the scheme only uses
keys such that when the secret keys and randomness used to generate the keys are
exposed, the user who constructed their keys to participate in ring signatures can
claim that they never intended to participate in ring signatures and only generated
the keys to use them for their default functions, such as secure communication or
message authentication for encryption and digital signatures respectively. We stated
in the previous section that a way to ensure deniability is to have the key generator
for a ring signature scheme generate public and private keys that are identical to those
generated by people who never anticipated participating in ring signature schemes.
The main scheme in [2] uses keys for public key encryption, digital signatures, and
ZAPs, all of which have a public key infrastructure and for which it can be assumed
that people will want this functionality independent of the fact that they can be
used for ring signatures. We will build on this scheme by using the same three
cryptographic primitives.
In order to construct a ring signature scheme based on the scheme from (2] that
is anonymous even if all of the secret encryption keys are divulged we will have the
signer avoid encrypting their ordinary signature in ERE. Instead, the signer will
encrypt a string of zeroes the same length as an ordinary signature. When the secret
keys are divulged and the cipher texts are decrypted, the underlying message 0 will
be revealed behind each cipher text, thereby preserving anonymity. The problem here
is that now the signer can not prove using the ZAP that one of the cipher texts is
an encryption of someone's signature, because in fact the statement is false. We will
have to change the language L for the ZAP so that the signer can still create a valid
signature (preserving completeness) while simultaneously ensuring that only someone
in the ring could prove membership of x E L (preserving unforgeability).
The trick behind our scheme is that when we generate our digital signature keys,
we will do so pseudorandomly rather than randomly. We will explain what this means
more formally in the next section, but just to give an idea of why the scheme works, we
note that this allows us to prove using the ZAP that "either the cipher texts Ci contain
an encryption of the signature of someone in the ring, OR someone in the ring had
their digital signature keys generated pseudorandomly rather than randomly." The
idea is that only someone who participated in the pseudorandom generation of their
signature keys would be able to prove that someone's keys were generated pseudoran-
domly, thereby proving that if someone could create this ZAP proof then they must
be in the ring. Anonymity is still preserved because the ZAP is witness hiding and
therefore does not give away whose keys were generated pseudorandomly, and this
can not be inferred by just looking at the keys because random and pseudorandom
are indistinguishable. This indistinguishability between random and pseudorandom
also allows us to achieve deniability because even if someone's keys were generated
pseudorandomly in order to create ring signatures, they can deny this fact even after
their secret keys are divulged and no feasible adversary would be able to tell whether
they were lying because they can not tell whether their keys are random or pseudo-
random. We have achieved deniability by requiring that the ring signature scheme be
based on keys that are indistinguishable from, rather than identical to the keys that
people generate for their own use of these public key cryptographic primitives.
In the following sections we will define and prove the security of pseudorandom key
generation schemes, formally define our modified ring signature scheme, and prove
that our scheme satisfies the strongest security definitions from [2].
4.1 Pseudorandom Key Generation
When a user of digital signature schemes generates their keys via GS(1), the gen-
erator algorithm flips some random coins w ER {0, 1 }q(n) for some polynomial q and
then computes the deterministic function GS(ln; w). If instead of using q(n) random
bits, we used only half as many random bits, but used a pseudorandom number gen-
erator to expand our string to the appropriate length, we will produce keys that are
computationally indistinguishable from the keys we would have produced if we had
picked all q(n) bits randomly. Furthermore, the digital signature scheme will be just
as secure if we use these pseudorandomly generated keys as it would have been if we
generated the keys randomly.
We now formally define a pseudorandom key generator G• for a digital signature
scheme (GS, Ss, VS), given a pseudorandom number generator f. Let fk be a pseudo-
random generator as in Definition 3, with 1(k) = 2k (meaning it stretches by a factor
of 2). Given w E {0, 1 }q(n)/2, we define & = fq(n)/2(w). We note that IlI = q(n) and
the ensembles of distributions {w +- {0, 1 }q(n)} and {w +- {0, 1 }q(n)/2: = fq(n)/2(W))
are computationally indistinguishable by the definition of a pseudorandom generator.
Now that we have defined a pseudorandom key generator Gs, we will prove two
lemmas that will allow us to replace Gs with this new generator and still be able to
use the keys for digital signatures, as well as for ring signatures. The first lemma
implies that if we were to use ds to generate signature keys rather than Gs, then
the ring signature scheme built upon this would still be deniable because no feasible
adversary could tell which generator we used, even if we divulge both the secret key
and the pseudorandom string (which we will try and pass off as random) used to
generate these keys.
Lemma 17 Given a PPT digital signature key generator Gs that uses a polynomial
q(n) bits of randomness, and a pseudorandom generator fk with l(k) = 2k, the follow-
ing two ensembles of probability distributions are computationally indistinguishable,
where Gs is defined as above:
W {0, 1}y(n); (PKs, SKs) = GS(ln; (w, PKS, SKS)}
{W - {0o, 1 }q(n)/2; (PKs, SKs) = Gs(1n; w): (fq(n)/2(W), PKs, SKS)}
Proof Suppose there existed some non-uniform PPT adversary A that could distin-
guish between the two ensembles for some auxiliary information zn with non-negligible
probability. We can obtain a contradiction by constructing an A' that distinguishes
between the two ensembles of distributions {w} and {c} defined above, using the
same auxiliary input zn. Given a string w from one of the two distributions, we sim-
ply run G(1~; w) = (PKs, SKs) and then run A on input (w, PKs, SKS), with auxiliary
input zn, and output whatever A outputs. We see that we will distinguish with the
same non-negligible probability as A because if our input is from the distribution {w}
then our input to A will be from the first distribution, while if our input is from the
distribution {f} then our input to A will be from the second distribution. 0
This next lemma implies that if we generate our keys using G3 instead of Gs, we
will preserve the functionality of the original digital signature scheme, even preserving
achievement of the strongest security guarantees. It is trivial to see that (Gs, Ss, V s )
is a digital signature scheme because completeness holds with probability 1 for the
original scheme and the keys that we generate with Gs are a subset of the keys
generated by Gs . We just need to show that the unforgeability condition holds:
Lemma 18 Given a digital signature scheme (Gs, Ss, Vs) that is secure against ex-
istential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks, the digital signature scheme
(Gs, Ss, Vs) where Gs is defined as above, is also secure against existential forgery
under adaptive chosen-message attacks.
Proof We can show that the existence of an adversary A that can produce a
forgery will allow us to distinguish between the two distributions of keys that were
proven computationally indistinguishable in the last lemma. Given (w, PKS, SKs)
from the first distribution, we know from the fact that (Gs, Ss, Vs) is existentially
unforgeable, that adversary A will produce a forgery with negligible probability if we
play the adversarial game using those keys. On the other hand, given (w, PKs, SKS)
from the second distribution, by assumption A will be able to produce a forgery with
non-negligible probability because this is the distribution of keys generated via the
scheme (GS, Ss, VS) that we are assuming A can break. Therefore if our adversary
A' for distinguishing the two distributions simply outputs 1 if and only if A produces
a forgery, A' will be distinguishing between the two distributions, contradicting the
previous lemma. U
4.2 Scheme Implementation
The implementation of our deniable ring signature scheme differs from that of [2] in
three main respects: 1) Signature keys are generated pseudorandomly rather than
randomly, 2) we do not produce an ordinary signature and then encrypt it but rather
just encrypt a string of zeroes, and 3) we use the ZAP prove membership in a slightly
different NP language that allows for witnesses that attest to the pseudorandomness
of a ring members signature keys.
We begin by defining the NP language L that we will be proving membership
in. The difference between L and L is that in L we take every clause from L and
"or" it with the statement that a ring member's digital signature keys were generated
pseudorandomly, i.e. there exist random coins w and a secret signing key SKs such
that the pseudorandom key generator Gs defined in the previous section, when given
random coins w, produces the correct secret and public signing key.
L= (m, Rs, RE, Ci• l) , 2 SKS, s.t.
k
V(ERE(a;w) = C, A VS (m,a)= 1) V S(l"; w2) = (pKs, SKS)}
i=1
We can see that this language is in NP just as L was because the only difference
is an extra "or" statement with each clause, two more polynomial size variables
after the existential quantifier, and the computation of a PPT function Gs which
is deterministic once the randomness w2 is provided. We are now ready to define the
modified ring signature scheme.
* Key Generator G(1"):
1. Generate signing key pair (PKS, SKs) -- S(1") and record random coins
ws from ds.
2. Generate encryption key pair (PKE, SKE) +- GE(n) (we will ignore the
secret encryption key for ring signature purposes).
3. Choose an initial ZAP message r +- {0, 1}z(n).
4. Output as the public key PK = (PKs, PKE, r) and as the private key
SK = (ws, SKS).
* Signing Algorithm Si*,SKi, (, R):
1. Parse R = (PK1,, PKk) and each PKi = (PKs, PKE, ri) and SKi. = (w. , SK s ).
Set RE = (PK , ..., PKE ) and Rs = (PK s , ..., PKS).
2. Set M = mlPKlI...IPKk where I denotes string concatenation.
3. Compute cipher texts Ci = ER,(O) for each i E [1, k].
4. Set statement x = (M, Rs, RE, iC)}k ) and witness w = (0,0, ws, SKS )
and use the ZAP with the first message rl from the lexicographically first
public key to produce the proof ir = Pr, (x, w) of the statement x e L.
5. Output the signature a = ({Ci}xl, ).
* Verification Algorithm VR(m, a):
1. ParseR = (PKI,..., PKk) and each PK2 = (PKf, PKF, ri) and a = ({Cj}jý , r).
Set RE = (PKf, ... , PKE), Rs = (PK, ..., PKS), and M= mPKl...IPKk
2. Set statement x = (M, Rs, RE, {Ci}}= 1)
3. Verify the proof 7r of x E L and output V4z (x, ir).
To verify the completeness of this ring signature scheme, we can see that a signer
that generated their digital signature keys pseudorandomly, via GS, as specified in G,
will produce a proof 7r using their ZAP with witness w = (0, 0, w, SK s ) that satisfies
the NP relation (x, w) for L. By the completeness of the ZAP, the proof will be
verified with probability 1 and hence the signature will be verified with probability 1.
4.3 Proofs of Security
Before we prove that our ring signature scheme achieves the strongest security guar-
antees proposed by [2], we make an observation about what it means to hand over to
the adversary the randomness used to generate keys. The reason we generated keys
pseudorandomly was so that when our secret keys and randomness are exposed, we
could pass off this pseudorandom string as our random string and noone would notice
and therefore suspect that we had planned to do ring signatures anymore than anyone
else. Therefore it would not be unreasonable to weaken the anonymity requirement
from [2] so that instead of the randomness from our ring signature generator G being
divulged, we can choose to divulge some concocted randomness that we pass off as the
randomness used to generate all of the underlying primitives, since we do not admit
to running any ring signature generator G anyways. However, the anonymity game
in the definition entails at least two honest users, where honest means they both had
their keys generated for ring signatures. Since there are at least two users who admit
to participating in ring signatures, we can have both users submit the actual random-
ness used to generate their ring signature keys and still show that the adversary can
not distinguish between the two possible signers in this case. We therefore prove that
we achieve the strongest guarantees from [2], but admit that the definition could be
weakened.
Theorem 19 If (GE, E, D) is a semantically secure encryption scheme, (GS, SS, Vs)
is a signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen mes-
sage attacks, GS is a pseudorandom key generator for Gs, and (P, VZ, 1) is a ZAP
for the language L, then our ring signature scheme defined above is unforgeable and
anonymous against full key exposure.
Proof We begin by proving anonymity and will then prove unforgeability.
4.3.1 Anonymity
We will show that if there exists an adversary A that can win the adversarial game in
Definition 15 with some non-negligible probability above . for some polynomial
p and infinitely many n, then we will use A to construct an adversary A' that can
distinguish between witnesses in a ZAP proof for the language L associated with our
ring signature scheme. A' will begin by generating keys {(PKi, SK-)}••() + G(1n) and
giving the set of public keys S = {PKi)il to A.
When A makes a query of the form SO(i*, m, R) with PKi. E R, we respond by
giving A a signature a i- SSK,. (m, R) which we can do because we have the secret
keys SKi. for all i* E [1, l]. Eventually A will output a message m, a ring R, and the
indices of two users io and il such that PKio and PKil are both in R. We will begin
constructing a signature for message m with respect to ring R as specified in S, which
we can do without committing to a signer i* until we have to construct the witness
for the ZAP proof. So far we will have constructed cipher texts C2 = ERE (0) for each
i [1, IRI] and we will also have the statement x = (M, RE, Rs, {Ci)~o), for which
we need to provide a proof that x E L. We note that at this point, we have two valid
witnesses that we could use: w0 = (0,0, WS SKo) and wl = (0,0,w, SK ) where
w and w4 are the random coins used in the pseudorandom signature key generation
algorithm Gs and stored in SKio and SKi, respectively.
Our adversary A' then submits the statement x and the two witnesses w0o and
wl for statement x as a challenge to try and distinguish between proofs using the
different witnesses. A' is then given back a proof ir of x which uses one of the two
witnesses. This proof r allows us to complete the challenge signature a = ({C} , 7r}
to give back to adversary A. We also give A the randomness {wj}! 0 used to produce
all the keys in G. We note that if A' was given a proof using witness wo, then the
distribution of signatures given to A will follow the distribution of signatures using
io as author, while if A' is given a proof using witness wl, then the distribution of
signatures given to A will follow the distribution of signatures that use il as author.
Furthermore the randomness J{w}i=o that we give A is the same regardless of which
witness was used. Therefore with probability . + ,A will output a bit b that
correctly corresponds to the witness that was used. So if A' simply outputs whatever
bit A outputs, then the probability that A' guesses the correct witness is also 1 + .
This contradicts the witness indistinguishability of the ZAP and therefore completes
our proof of anonymity.
4.3.2 Unforgeability
The basic idea behind our proof for unforgeability is that if there exists an adversary
that produces forgeries with non-negligible probability, we will use this adversary to
extract a forgery for the digital signature scheme of one of the members of the ring,
contradicting the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme. We note that if an
adversary is producing forgeries, this means that the ZAP proofs produced in the
signatures are valid, implying one of the two following events: there is an ordinary
signature belonging to one of the ring members encrypted in one of the cipher texts or
one of the ring members had their digital signature keys generated pseudorandomly.
We would like to force the adversary to produce proofs using the first type of witness,
so that we can extract a forgery. This is tough to do as long as all the ring members'
signature keys are in fact generated pseudorandomly. To get around this, we create
hybrid experiments in which we switch the signature keys of all of the users from
pseudorandom to random, counting on the fact that the adversary can not tell the
difference. The main challenge is in how we respond to oracle queries during the
hybrid experiments.
To formalize how we may behave in response to oracle queries in the different
hybrid experiments, we first define two alternative versions of the signing algorithm
S: S1 and S2. Like the original signing algorithm S, S1 assumes that the author i*
had their digital signature keys generated pseudorandomly, and the algorithm has
access to a witness w that generated these pseudorandom keys. Signing algorithm S1
operates just like S except that in creating the cipher texts C1 , instead of encrypting
0 in all the cipher texts, S1 encrypts a digital signature i .(M) in the i*th cipher
text, as in the scheme from [2]. This opens up the opportunity for a different witness,
namely w = (ai., i., 0,0) (where wi. is the randomness from the encryption algo-
rithm ERE), to be used for the ZAP proof, rather than the witness attesting to the
pseudorandomness of SKY. However, we still define S1 use the same witness as S.
Signing algorithm S2 operates just like S, except that we use the alternative
witness w attesting to the fact that an ordinary signature of i* has been encrypted
in one of the cipher texts. We note that in this signing algorithm we are no longer
dependent on the pseudorandomness of i*'s digital signature keys and so this signing
algorithm would produce a valid signature (meaning it would pass verification by V)
even if the digital signature keys were generated randomly.
We first define an alternate adversarial game, in which the keys are all generated
randomly and queries are all answered using signing algorithm S2 and show that
the existence of a successful adversary in this game contradicts the unforgeability of
the underlying digital signature scheme. Then we will show, using hybrid experi-
ments, that the existence of a successful adversary in this alternate adversarial game
is equivalent to the existence of a successful adversary for the original adversarial
game.
Our new adversarial game will be similar to the original game except that we
alter the key generation algorithm G and the signing algorithm S. We alter S so
that instead of producing signature keys via Gs, it produces these keys using GS. We
also alter G to store the secret encryption keys produced by GE. We also replace the
signing algorithm S with the alternate signing algorithm S2 that does not depend on
pseudorandom keys. Suppose there exists some PPT adversary A that can produce a
forgery in this altered game with non-negligible probability 1 for some polynomial
p. We construct an adversary A' that forges the underlying digital signature scheme
with non-negligible probability 1 where 1(n) is the polynomial number of ring
signature keys given to A.
We know by the soundness of the ZAP that with all but negligible probability, A
will not be able to produce proofs for false theorems. We also know that because the
digital signature keys were generated randomly, via Gs, rather than pseudorandomly,
the probability that there exists some random coins w so that GS(ln; w) produces
one of these keys is negligibly small. Therefore with all but a negligible probability,
when A produces a forgery, there is in fact an ordinary signature of one of the ring
members encrypted in one of the cipher texts. Our strategy will be to randomly guess
in advance, out of the 1(n) possible signers, which signer will be used for the ordinary
signature produced in the forgery produced by A. We can then create an adversary A'
to forge the digital signature scheme. A' will be given a public signing key, PKS and
adaptive access to an oracle for digital signatures. A' will produce 1(n) ring signature
keys, as the adversarial game mandates, except that for one randomly chosen user i,
we will insert PKs as their public signing key, and not generate a secret signing key
for them.
A' can give these keys to A and respond to the oracle and corruption queries as
follows: If A requests a signature for a message m with respect to a ring R and a
signer i* Z i, then we can produce the signature honestly using S2 because we know
the secret key SKY. If A asks for a signature of a message m for a ring R with
i as the signer, we compute S2 except for the part where we produce the ordinary
signature. For this we take the corresponding M = mlPKil ... PKi RI, and submit it
to our digital signature oracle, and proceed with the computation of S2 using the a
that was returned by the oracle. If A corrupts a user i y i, we provide their secret
key SKI which we know. If A corrupts user i, we simply abort. Eventually A will
output a forgery for a message m and a ring R that it did not query before. With
probability negligibly close to 1 of the times that A successfully produces a forgery,
this forgery will contain a digital signature a' of i of message M corresponding to
m on ring R, and we will not have aborted in this run because A could not have
corrupted any of the users in the ring R. Since A did not query m with ring R before,
the corresponding M could not have been queried by A' to its digital signature oracle.
Therefore the A' can decrypt the cipher texts of the signature produced by A and
extract the ordinary signature a' which it can then output as its forgery.
Since A outputs a forgery with non-negligible probability, and A' will be able to
extract a digital signature forgery a non-negligible fraction of those times, we have
contradicted the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme.
Now we will show that given a PPT adversary A that succeeds with non-negligible
probability in the original adversarial game, A also succeeds with non-negligible prob-
ability at this second adversarial game. Call our interaction with A via the second
adversarial game experiment Ea and our interaction with A via the original adversarial
game experiment Eb. We will show that Ea and Eb are computationally indistinguish-
able using a series of hybrid experiments. We will use the polynomially long sequence
of hybrid experiments (Ea = E° , Ed, ..., E = Eo, E, , E"(n) = E, E, ... , E•~ ) =
Eb), where q(n) is the number of queries adversary A makes to the signing oracle. We
define the experiment Eg to be the experiment in which the first i signature keys out
of the 1 keys given to A are generated pseudorandomly, while the rest are generated
randomly, and all oracle queries are still answered with signing algorithm S2 as in
the second adversarial game. We define El to be the experiment in which all keys
are generated pseudorandomly, as in adversarial game 2, the first i out of q(n) oracle
queries are answered with signing algorithm S1, and the rest are answered with S2.
Finally we define E2 to be the experiment in which all keys are generated pseudo-
randomly, the first i oracle queries are answered with the original signing algorithm
S, and the rest are answered with S1. It can be verified by definition that the equal-
ities written in the sequence of experiments are true. If we use the notation that l
denotes computational indistinguishability, then we need to show the following three
statements: E ; E ~ +1 , El P El'+ , EP ; E • .
To show the first computational indistinguishability result, we note that the only
difference between the two experiments is that one extra digital signature key that is
given to the adversary has been generated randomly rather than pseudorandomly. If
this difference triggers a difference in behavior in A (such as successfully producing
forgeries in one case and not the other), then we can exploit this difference to distin-
guish pseudorandom keys from random keys, contradicting Lemma 17. To do this,
we generate the first i keys pseudorandomly, as both experiments mandate, and we
take the digital signature keys for user i + 1 as a challenge, being either random or
pseudorandom. We generate the remaining keys randomly, also as both experiments
mandate. Now we can see that if our challenge keys were generated randomly, we
will be running Ei, while if they are pseudorandom we will be running E + ' . Since A
distinguishing between those two experiments would allow us to distinguish between
the two distributions, we have shown that E0 P E0+ 1.
For the second pair of experiments, Ei and Ef+', we note that the only difference is
that in the second experiment, the (i + 1)st oracle query was answered using S1 rather
than S2. Since the only difference between the two signing algorithms is the witness
used in the ZAP proof, we can use a distinguisher between these two experiments to
contradict the witness indistinguishability of the ZAP. This proves that El ; E' +1 .
For the last pair of experiments, we note that the only difference is that in the
second experiment, the (i + 1)st oracle query is answered with signing algorithm S
rather than S1. Since the only difference between these two signing algorithms is
that in S we compute an encryption of 0 while in Si we compute an encryption of
a signature, the semantic security of the encryption scheme implies that these two
experiments are indistinguishable. Otherwise we could use A to distinguish between
encryptions of the two messages, 0 and a. More specifically, we need to take as
challenge an encryption scheme and plant this encryption scheme in the adversarial
game with A in such a way that for the i + 1st query, the challenge encryption scheme
is used. This means we need to guess randomly one of the users, i that will be
specified in the ring of the i + 1st query and set their encryption public keys to be
the challenge keys. Then when the i + 1st query comes along, we can construct two
possible messages to encrypt in i's part of the encryption ERE: one message that
forces the entire message encrypted to add up to 0, and another message that causes
the total message to add up to an ordinary signature signed by the specified author
i*. These two messages can be submitted as the challenge and the returned cipher
text can be inserted into the ring signature so that in one case the resulting signature
follows the distribution from S and in the other case it follows the distribution of S,.
Since we will guess a user in the ring with probability at least -L and in this situation
A will distinguish between the two distributions with non-negligible probability, this
allows us to distinguish between encryptions of the two messages with non-negligible
probability, thereby proving that Ei P E•+.
These three computational indistinguishability results can be combined to show
that Ea - Eb. This is really iterating over a polynomial number of computational
indistinguishability results, which we can do because a negligible difference multiplied
by a polynomial is still negligible. Since the two end experiments are computationally
indistinguishable, this shows that the PPT adversary that produces a forgery in our
ring signature scheme contradicts the unforgeability of the underlying digital signature
scheme, thereby proving that our scheme is unforgeable. U

Chapter 5
Future Work and Conclusion
We have demonstrated the existence of a ring signature scheme, without random or-
acles, that achieves the strongest security definitions in the literature, and does so in
such a way that does not depend on primitives that might distinguish a ring signature
user from someone who never intended to participate in ring signatures and had the
same primitives for other purposes. One weakness of our scheme is that instead of
having users generate signature keys according to the same distribution as ordinary
digital signature users do, we mandate that to participate in ring signatures, one must
generate their keys according to a distribution that is different, albeit indistinguish-
able, from this generic distribution. This is a weakness in the sense that it prevents
someone from producing ring signatures if they did not plan on producing ring signa-
tures at the time they generated their keys. While this could be overcome by changing
one's keys, it must still be seen as a weakness and a scheme that allowed someone to
convert to a ring signature user without any key generation or replacement would be
ideal.
One criticism that might be leveled at both the scheme presented here and the
scheme in [2] is the dependence on ZAPs. While ZAPs could function as a general
purpose tool because they are not designed specifically for ring signatures and it is
understandable that many people might publish ZAP keys just so people could prove
theorems to them, they are not ubiquitous in the way that public key encryption
and digital signature keys are at the moment. An improvement might therefore be
to construct a scheme that meets the strongest definitions but without depending on
ZAPs.
Another issue to consider is a stronger anonymity definition in which a signer is
protected against being framed, in the sense that if they are the only honest user in
a ring for which they produced a signature, we would at least want the adversary
to not to be able to prove to some separate authority that the signer was indeed
the author of the message, even when all secret keys are exposed. We postulate
here, without formal proof, that the scheme we present in this paper achieves this
guarantee because this would essentially amount to an adversary proving that the
signing keys of the author are pseudorandom (which is hard to show without the
original randomness) and that all of the keys belonging to the adversary were not
pseudorandom. Any polynomial time judge that might accept proofs of this form
could be fooled by altering the keys of the adversary to be pseudorandom and setting
the adversary as the author. In this case the judge would be accepting false theorems
and therefore could not be considered an authority to accept such proofs.
It is also foreseeable that the unforgeability requirement could be strengthened by
having the adversary's corruption oracle return the randomness that produced the
secret keys in addition to just the secret keys. While the unforgeability of the scheme
presented here, as well as that of the modified scheme in [2], seem to depend on the
fact that the adversary does not have access to this randomness, it is unclear why
this should be the case and whether a scheme could be constructed that meets the
stronger variation of this unforgeability requirement.
One final direction for future work is to find applications for ring signatures that
meet the strongest security requirements. The flexibility of ring signature schemes
to include arbitrary groups of users, whether or not they planned on participating in
ring signatures, has already produced numerous applications, some of which we have
mentioned here, and promises to lead to many more.
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